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Article
COMPARATIVE CLIMATE CHANGE TORTS
Robert F. Blomquist*
Climate change torts are in their collective infancy. Yet, there have been a
few climate change tort actions launched, largely in the United States, against
major carbon emitters. Comparative tort law in countries around the world
present interesting possibilities for future climate change tort actions seeking
money damages and injunctive relief in coming years.
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I. INTRODUCTION

With breathtaking speed, “[o]ver the course of the last few years,
climate change litigation has been transformed from a creative lawyering
strategy to a major force in transnational regulatory governance of
greenhouse gas emissions.”1 Climate change litigation is, in large part, a
multi-pronged attempt by governments and non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”), to politically pressure industrial greenhouse
gas emitters and enablers.
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I am grateful for the
opportunity to have served as a panel chair for a conference on Litigating Climate Change
held in February, 2011, at the Valparaiso University School of Law; many of the insights
from that conference inspired this Article. For articles presented at the conference, see
Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air: Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy
Act, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 411 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal
Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447 (2012);
Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, & Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the Tools
for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369 (2012).
1
William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies That Drive Potential
Causes of Action for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL,
AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 1 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
*
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One recent commentator emphasized “the socio-legal role that
climate change litigation plays” in constituting “a formal part of the
regulatory process” as well as serving as an “expressive,” or “social
norm creating” force.2 In particular, “[t]he adjudication provides a
mechanism for dialogue and awareness . . . in a regulatory environment
in which policies have not caught up with the problem. At least as
important, it creates diagonal interactions through which different levels
and branches of regulators interact and grapple with what is needed.”3
Climate change litigation encompasses subnational,4 national,5 and
supranational6 case studies.7 Yet, from the perspective of tort law—as
distinct from regulatory/administrative law,8 land use law,9 human
Hari M. Osofsky, Conclusion:
Adjudicating Climate Change Across Scales, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES,
supra note 1, at 380, 383.
3
Id. at 383 (footnote omitted).
4
See, e.g., Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Climate Change Policy: A Case
Study of the Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE
CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 31; Mary
Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 99.
5
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v.
EPA, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 129; Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from
Climate Change: The Case Against Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 173.
6
See, e.g., William C.G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under
the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 314; Hari M. Osofsky, The
Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES,
supra note 1, at 272 [hereinafter The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate
Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights]; Erica J. Thorson, The World Heritage Convention and
Climate Change: The Case for a Climate-Change Mitigation Strategy Beyond the Kyoto Protocol, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES,
supra note 1, at 255.
7
Cf. Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory
Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L. L. 585, 587 (2009) (“[T]he nature of climate change regulation
necessitates multiscalar legal approaches—that is, ones which simultaneously engage more
than one level of governance” because “[c]limate change is an individual, local, state,
national, regional, and international problem” and “carbon is so deeply embedded in the
global economy and its impacts manifest in specific ways in different places [that]
emissions and impacts occur at multiple levels simultaneously.”).
8
Cf. Lesley K. McAllister, Litigating Climate Change at the Coal Mine, in ADJUDICATING
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 48
(discussing assorted Australian cases involving judicial orders requiring governmental
agencies to examine the environmental impacts of greenhouse gases directly produced by
coal mines and the future environmental impacts of burning coal).
9
Cf. Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons:
Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
2
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rights law,10 and international law11—the theory and practice of pleading
and proving a civil wrong caused by one or more defendants’ “climate
change” conduct, sufficient to trigger entitlement to money damages or
injunctive relief, or both, is seriously problematic at present. Given the
creativity and persistence of tort lawyers, however, it is likely that within
the next several decades of the twenty-first century, in the United States
as well as other countries, climate change torts will be recognized in
individual cases that apply traditional tort causes of actions and evolving
new tort causes of action. In such cases, tort plaintiffs will likely recover
money damages and equitable relief for their harms.
The remainder of this Article is organized into two principal parts.
In Part II, climate change tort developments in the United States will be
discussed. In Part III, a broad-brush comparative climate change tort
perspective is sketched out by looking at recent developments in other
countries. A brief sketch of potential future scenarios and strategies of
various climate change torts is considered in the Conclusion.
II. AMERICAN CLIMATE TORT LAW DEVELOPMENTS
As noted by David A. Grossman: “Tort-based climate change
litigation strikes many people as a strange idea at first. Basic tort
principles, however, combined with . . . scientific [evidence] . . . may
provide a basis for liability claims against major corporate emitters for
some of climate change’s effects.”12 Expanding on an earlier article that
he wrote,13 Grossman provided an update, as of 2009, to American “tort
law [principles] to hold companies emitting substantial amounts of

NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 72–73 (discussing the New
Zealand Environment Court’s reversal of a local land use decision regarding the location of
a small wind farm based on the positive national benefits of renewable energy outweighing
the negative local effects).
10
Cf. The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, supra note 6 (discussing a petition filed with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the Inuit people in the United States and
Canada alleging that U.S. climate change policy violated their human rights).
11
Cf. Andrew Strauss, Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the International
Court of Justice, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:
STATE, NATIONAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 334, 336–50 (formulating a strategy for
litigating climate change disputes before the International Court of Justice).
12
David A. Grossman, Tort-Based Climate Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE:
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 193, 228 [hereinafter
Tort-Based Climate Litigation].
13
David A. Grossman, Warming Up To a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003).
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greenhouse gases liable for at least some of the harms caused by climate
change.”14
Grossman offers a number of illuminating observations about
traditional American tort law and climate change. First, from an
overarching perspective, “because of the uneven nature and distribution
of the effects of climate change . . . [t]his . . . raises the question of
whether we should continue to ask the victims of climate change to bear
these costs or transfer them [via tort law] to those who have most
substantially contributed to creating the harm.”15 Second, “[p]ublic
nuisance seems to be the strongest of the climate tort claims” because of
the tort’s “focus on ‘unreasonable injury,’”16 the use of “public nuisance
suits for decades to address pollution,”17 and since “[t]he application of
nuisance law to the problem of climate change does not appear to be that
novel an extension.”18 Third, “[p]roducts liability is another tort theory
potentially applicable to climate change, although it seems to be a
significantly weaker claim than public nuisance, which may be why no
plaintiffs have filed climate change products liability suits to date.”19
According to Grossman’s analysis:
All things considered, . . . climate change plaintiffs’
strongest products liability claim [among warning
Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 193.
Id. at 194. He properly notes that “[a]llocation of the costs of harms is . . . [a] central
tort concern.” Id. (citing Eduardo M. Penalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort
Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 569 (1998)).
16
Id. at 195, 228.
17
Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
18
Id. (footnote omitted). Grossman highlights three recent public nuisance climate cases
that have not yet reached the merits: Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
(revealing that eight states, New York City, and three land trusts separately sued electric
power companies that owned and operated fossil-fuel-fired power plants in twenty states
seeking abatement of ongoing contributions to the public nuisance of global warming and
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing, that the Clean Air Act and
Environmental Protection Agency actions it authorizes displaced any federal common law
right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from the power plants, and the
availability of claims under state nuisance law would be left for consideration on remand),
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007), and Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (telling of a public nuisance claim against twenty-four oil, gas, and power
companies seeking a declaratory judgment for damages and expenses as well as alleging
civil conspiracy and concert of action). Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 195—
196.
19
Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 199 (“The basic elements of a products
liability claim are: (1) a product has a defect that makes it unreasonably dangerous; (2) this
defect existed when the product left the defendant’s control; and (3) the defect proximately
caused plaintiff’s injuries.”).
14
15
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defects, design defects, and negligence] would appear to
be a design defect suit. However, recognition of
manufacturers’ [such as automobile companies’] duties
to climate change victims outside of their capacity as
users or consumers of products that emit carbon dioxide
is by no means certain, and potential defendants might
be able to present strong “state of the art” defenses.
While a products liability claim might be viable,
therefore, these caveats suggest that it is a much weaker
claim than public nuisance.20
Fourth, speaking to potential jurisdictional hurdles in American
climate change tort suits, Grossman concludes that, in light of recent U.S.
Supreme Court standing jurisprudence, “the ability of plaintiffs in a
climate tort case to establish standing . . . appears greatly enhanced.”21
While displacement of federal common law nuisance claims is now the
law after American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,22 Grossman concludes
that federal preemption of state common law claims is unlikely, “at least
until comprehensive [air pollution] regulations are in place (and perhaps
[not] even then, if the regulations do not provide a remedy for
harms) . . . so long as the emissions at issue in the state common law
claims are not from motor vehicles.”23 Fifth, “[c]ausation in any climate
change tort suit will be a complicated issue, as plaintiffs must show that
their harms are traceable to defendants’ actions.”24 Generic and specific
causation is problematic in climate change tort suits because “several
factors are involved in producing shifts in climatic activity” and “[t]hese
multiple causes and background levels of climatic effects make it
difficult to show that [the] defendants’ contributions to anthropogenic
climate change caused any particular incidence of a phenomenon.”25
Focusing on the emerging common law duty of care in American
climate change tort law—potentially applicable to a variety of tort causes
of action (from the tort of negligence to product liability claims, from
private nuisance to public nuisance suits)—Professors David Hunter and
James Salzman provide a fascinating discussion of technological trends,
foreseeable risks of harm, and reasonable mitigation measures that will
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
22
131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011). “The [Clean Air] Act itself . . . provides a means to seek
limits on emissions of carbon dioxide . . . —the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking
federal common law. We see no room for a parallel track.” Id.
23
Tort-Based Climate Litigation, supra note 12, at 213.
24
Id. at 215.
25
Id. at 217 (footnote omitted).
20
21
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drive the next wave of climate change tort suits in their article, Negligence
In the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation.26 In considering
potential “duty issues” of key potential climate tort defendants, they
state:
Car makers, oil companies, utilities, and others all have a
duty to behave reasonably and avoid the unreasonable
imposition of harm on others, of course, but what is the
nature of this duty? With respect to car companies, for
example, is it unreasonable to produce cars that fully
comply with existing regulatory requirements? Have
the impacts of auto emissions on the climate been so
foreseeable in the past that a reasonable car company
should have accounted for them in its design? Or is it
sufficient that car companies have been conforming to
general industry norms and customs? Indeed, given the
consistently strong consumer demand for SUVs and cars
with powerful engines, could a car company even have
stayed in business if it produced only cars with low
greenhouse gas emissions? Looking to the future, when
will foreseeability and design options have progressed
enough that the duty of car companies should evolve?
Does the consistent lobbying of some automobile
companies
against
national
fuel
emissions
standards . . . have relevance to their potential liability?
Similar questions could be posed of fossil fuel
producers, utilities, and other potential defendants.27
Looking at the classic Judge Learned Hand negligence formula,28
Hunter and Saltzman opine: “The identifiable risks of climate change
are becoming better understood, and most of them have become more
likely with greater consequences than was thought even a decade ago.”29
Moreover, “new technologies are lowering the costs of pollution control
equipment, carbon storage, fuel switching, and renewable and other

26
David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate
Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007).
27
Id. at 1750–51.
28
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s
duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of
three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.”).
29
Hunter & Salzman, supra note 26, at 1757.
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energy alternatives.”30
Considering the potential “moral
blameworthiness or unreasonableness of a defendant’s climate-changing
activities,”31 the authors suggest a variety of relevant inquiries in climate
change litigation:
x Marketing a product (for example, an automobile) that is
particularly inefficient.
x Planning a large expansion of electricity generation from coalfired power plants without budgeting for any mitigation steps.
x Taking preventive measures in foreign operations (where they
may be subject to climate-related regulations) while continuing
to operate without such measures [in the United States].
x Making public statements or issuing policies that appear climate
friendly but do not reflect actual operations.
x Reducing research and development budgets or slowing
deployment of more carbon-efficient technologies or products.
x Issuing or promoting misinformation about climate change that
the company knows or reasonably should have known is false.
x Withholding studies or information that would increase our
understanding of climate change.
x Destroying climate change related documents.32
In closing this brief survey of important American tort law
developments, it is instructive to note some innovative climate change
tort theories and related liability theories suggested by other
commentators.
Professor Mary Christina Wood has argued for
“‘atmospheric trust litigation’” against all levels of American
government to hold the government “accountable for reducing carbon
emissions.”33 According to Wood, “[s]uch litigation rests on the premise
that all governments hold natural resources in trust for their citizens and
bear the fiduciary obligation to protect such resources for future
generations.”34 Moreover, Aura Weinbaum contends that, as a gapfilling climate change liability strategy to traditional tort causes of action,
compensation based on restitution for unjust enrichment of emitters
would be a fruitful idea.35
Id.
Id. at 1773.
32
Id. at 1774 (footnotes omitted).
33
Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE
CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 99.
34
Id.
35
Aura Weinbaum, Unjust Enrichment: An Alternative to Tort Law and Human Rights in
the Climate Change Context?, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 429 (2011). Recently, a seminal
comparative law book was published: CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW
30
31
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III. COMPARATIVE CLIMATE TORT LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Overview and Introduction
In this Part, the preliminary discussion focuses on comparative
environmental laws and policies that should be viewed as analogous to
potential tort-based claims for environmentally-induced harms. Then
the commentary shifts to specific comparative tort-based climate change
legal matters.
As an initial comparative law observation relevant to global climate
change litigation, it is interesting to note that more than half of the 195
nations of the world—by one estimate 109 states36—“have constitutional
environmental provisions of some kind,” while “no recently
promulgated constitution omits these, and many older constitutions are
being amended to include them.”37 According to Kathryn Kintzele’s
analysis of national constitutional environmental provisions:
Constitutions often carry a similar structure, regardless
of the state: an opening, or preambulatory, aspirational
PRACTICE (Richard Lord, Silke Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani & Jutta Brunnee eds.
2012) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY]. Under the rubric of “private law,” this
book examines, among other climate liability topics, the following:
Private law claims envisage one person, C, who alleges he/she has
suffered damage from climate change, suing D, who is allegedly
responsible in part for it, for compensation, or for an order to make D
change his/her behaviour. C might be a person who suffered in a
heatwave [sic], or had his/her house flooded. D might be an oil
company or power generator. The claim will be brought in “tort” or
“delict.” In common law systems a specific tort has to be alleged, and
those most commonly discussed in this context are “nuisance” and
“negligence.” Establishment of this type of liability has been seen as a
kind of holy grail by environmental campaigners and as an
unacceptable disaster scenario by sectors of industry which might have
to bear the cost. The numbers of potential claimants and defendants in
this type of action, and the scale of potential compensation, are all
huge, and indeed the very wide scope of such claims is one policy
factor against their being permitted. No action of this type has yet
succeeded. Few have been brought, almost all in the United States of
America.
Jutta Brunnée, Silke Goldberg, Richard Lord QC & Lavanya Rajamani, Overview of Legal
Issues Relevant to Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra, at 32–33 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) (American English spelling). For a detailed and timely analysis
and quantification of U.S. climate change liability developments; see Michael B. Gerrard &
Gregory E. Wannier, United States of America, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra, at 556–
604.
36
TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 22, n.2 (2005) (citation
omitted).
37
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
AND
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statement, followed by numerated, operational clauses
detailing the rights and duties of the government and
the citizenry. Many of the clear ethical statements found
in constitutions are often preambulatory, but many of
the operative clauses show ethical considerations, as
well.38
Kintzele identifies a variety of environmental constitutional
provisions of foreign nations that have potential implications for climate
change tort-based litigation.
Among the national environmental
constitutional provisions extant are those of Ecuador,39 Cuba,40 France,41
Bhutan,42 Montenegro,43 Iraq,44 and Kenya.45
Kathryn Kintzele, Keeping Nature Alive: From Moral Motivations to Legal Implications, in
GLOBALISATION AND ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY IN SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 233
(Laura Westra, Klaus Bosselmann, & Colin Soskolne eds., 2011).
39
“‘Nature has the right to an integral restoration. This integral restoration is
independent of the obligation on natural and juridical persons or the State to indemnify the
people and the collectives that depend on the natural systems.’” Id. at 234 (footnote
omitted) (quoting República del Ecuador’s, Rights of Nature, art. 2 (2008)).
40
“The [s]tate protects the environment and natural resources of the country. It
recognizes their close link with the sustainable economy and social development for
making human life more sensible, and for ensuring survival, welfare and security of
present and future generations.” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting República de Cuba (1992)).
41
“The French People, considering that natural resources and equilibriums have
conditioned the emergence of mankind; the future and very existence of mankind are
inextricably linked with its natural environment . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting
Charte de l’Environnement, République Française (1958, amended 2007)). Moreover:
“When the occurrence of any damage, albeit unpredictable in the current state of scientific
knowledge, may seriously and irreversibly harm the environment, public authorities shall,
with due respect for the principle of precaution and the areas within their jurisdiction,
ensure the implementation of procedures . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Charte de l’Environnement, République Française, Art. 5 (1958, amended
2007)).
42
“Parliament may, in order to ensure sustainable use of natural resources, enact
environmental legislation and implement environmental standards and instruments based
on the precautionary principle, polluter pay principle, maintenance of intergenerational
equity . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Bhutan, art. 5,
Environment 4 (2008)).
43
“Montenegro is a civil, democratic, ecological state with social justice, based on the
rule of law.” Id. at 235 (footnote omitted) (quoting Montenegro, art. I (2007)).
44
Iraq mandates a constitutional oath be taken by each member of the Council of
Representatives: “I swear by God Almighty to carry out my legal duties and
responsibilities with devotion and integrity and preserve the independence and
sovereignty of Iraq, and safeguard the interests of its people, and ensure the safety of its
land, sky, water, wealth, and federal democratic system . . . .” Id. (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Article 50, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of
the Republic of Iraq] of 2005).
45
“The [s]tate shall . . . ensure that social and cultural values traditionally applied by the
communities of Kenya for the sustainable management of the environment and natural
38
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Beyond national environmental constitutional provisions, domestic
courts in numerous foreign nations have found enforceable
environmental rights emanating from national constitutions. These
judicial opinions, based on interpretation of their respective national
constitutions, stem from cases in India,46 Columbia, and Nigeria.47
Joining this trend is the 1993 Philippines Supreme Court’s opinion in
Oposa v. Factoran, where the court opined:
[T]he right to a balanced and healthful ecology belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
the advancement of which may even be said to predate
all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself the day would not be
too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.48
There are also non-constitutional foreign law principles that are
analogous and relevant to potential tort-based climate change law.
India’s substantive law, for example, “has a robust public trust doctrine
that citizens there can draw upon to establish atmospheric trust

resources are observed.” Id. at 236 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Jamhuri ya Kenya, Republic of Kenya, chs. 8–87 (2001, amended 2008)).
46
Sinden, supra note 5, at 186 (citing Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) A.I.R.
1480 S.C. 717; Michael R. Anderson, Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India, in
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 199, 215–16 (Alan E. Boyle &
Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996)).
47
Id. (citing Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson & Nicholas Tary, Human Rights and the
Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 382–87
(2004)).
48
Wood, supra note 4, at 101–02, n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Juan Antonio Oposa
v. Fulgenico S. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., 1993) (Phil.), excerpted in JAN G. LAITOS,
SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MARY C. WOOD & DAN H. COLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 441–44
(2006)).
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responsibility.”49 In a similar vein, Indian tort law, according to one
authoritative account, has the potential of holding enterprises that cause
environmental or health damages to an absolute liability standard, with
no exceptions; if the enterprises are adjudicated as being engaged in
hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.50 Furthermore, the India
Supreme Court has held that, in hazardous substance tort actions, “the
measure of compensation must be correlated to the magnitude and
capacity of the enterprise, thereby challenging well-settled principles of
tort law” and allowing a potential liability for climate change torts
whereby “the larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater
must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused
on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or
inherently dangerous activities.”51
Climate change litigation in Europe has “differed from that of the
[United States] mainly because of the diverse and less homogeneous
framework that characterizes Europe.”52 Indeed, “[e]ach European state
tends to tackle domestic issues, including those related to the
environment, with a unique and cultural-specific approach, not only
from a legal perspective, but also from political and cultural points of
view.”53 Yet, the supranational political and legal structure of the
European Union has created an Emissions Trading Scheme (“ETS”),
which, in turn, has spawned “a considerable number of proceedings”
before European supranational courts focusing on various aspect of
Directive 2003/87/EC, establishing the ETS “allowances for the quantity
of CO2 that can be emitted by a single Member state over a particular
period” of time.54 The supranational European carbon market litigation
49
Id. at 124 (citing M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (India)); Karnataka
Indus. Areas Dev. Bd. v. Sri C. Kenchappa, A.I.R. 2006 S.C.W. 2546 (India); T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 4256; Perumatty Grama
Panchayat v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 K.L.T. 731 (India); Deepa Badrinarayana, The
Emerging Constitutional Challenge of Climate Change: India in Perspective, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 26 n.137 (2009)).
50
See Els Reynaers & Krishnan Venkataraman, India, in ENVIRONMENT IN 26
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 74, 79 (Carlos de Miguel Perales ed. 2008),
http://www.smarteeconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/india-18.pdf.
51
Id. at 78; see also, RICHARD DUNDAS ALEXANDER, INDIAN CASE-LAW ON TORTS (R.F.
Rampinini, 3d ed. 1906); LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL
(Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994).
52
Luciano Butti, The Tortuous Road to Liability: A Critical Survey on Climate Litigation in
Europe and North America, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 32, 34 (2011).
53
Id.
54
Id. (citing JAN H. JANS & HANS H.B. VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 385–88
(3d ed. 2008); A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66
(2007)).
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to date can be “conceptually divided into the following three categories:
challenges to the validity of the directive, infringement proceedings, and
challenges to decisions of the European Commission on the National
Allocation Plans designed by the Member states for re-allocating the
One Italian scholar has
allowances to national installations.”55
commented on these European carbon litigation trends by observing:
“Evidently, little room is left for individual applications aimed at
recovering [tort-based] damages suffered as a result of global warming,
and therefore, linked to CO2 emissions.”56 Indeed, according to this
view, compared to the potential tort-based trajectory of U.S. carbon
litigation in the future, “[t]he influence of the resulting [European
regulatory] jurisprudence thus ends up being considerably more limited,
and the possibilities of evolution more scant.”57 Yet, another scholar,
Giedré Kaminskaité-Salters, focusing on English law, has boldly
articulated a possible tort-based legal approach to achieve legal redress
in his book, Constructing a Private Climate Change Lawsuit Under English
Law: A Comparative Perspective.58
B. Asia and Pacific National Laws59
Australia—a commonwealth, consisting of “a federal State with
three levels of government comprising a national government, the
governments of six states and two territories, and local government”60—
“is one of the developed countries most vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change.”61 Greatly influenced by English tort law, the tort of
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id.
57
Id.
58
GIEDRÉ KAMINSKAITÉ-SALTERS, CONSTRUCTING A PRIVATE CLIMATE CHANGE LAWSUIT
UNDER ENGLISH LAW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2010).
59
The regional headings and national law summaries that follow rely extensively on the
approach taken by the various authors in the book, CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note
35.
60
Ross Abbs, Peter Cashman & Tim Stephens, Australia, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY,
supra note 35, at 67.
61
Id. at 70. In particular:
As the driest inhabited continent on earth, with already high levels of
climate variability, Australia can expect a range of severe impacts if
there is no mitigation of global emissions. Under a business-as-usual
scenario it is expected that by 2100 drought will be increasingly
frequent; there will be severe stress on urban water supplies; irrigated
agricultural production in the Murray Darling Basin, Australia’s main
“food bowl,” will have declined by more than [ninety] per cent [sic];
the Great Barrier Reef will effectively have been destroyed; and many
coastal areas including the Kakadu wetlands will have been
transformed by rising sea levels.
55
56
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negligence under relevant Australian law, would be problematic
because: (1) plaintiffs would likely have difficulties establishing duty of
due care; (2) there would be issues of foreseeability; (3) there is
conservative precedent regarding legal policy reasons to recognize a
duty; (4) proximate causation problems would surface; (5) there would
be standard of care and breach of duty barriers stemming from multiple
and diffuse sources of greenhouse gases and the social usefulness of
carbon-intensive industrial and mining activities; (6) causation proof
problems would erupt; and (7) there would be scope of liability
limitations.62 Australian private and public nuisance “law is poorly
adapted to dealing with the consequences of large-scale industrial
activity, and has rarely ventured beyond cases involving close
geographical propinquity.”63 So, “while the law of nuisance might have
the potential to short-circuit some of the complications associated with
the law of negligence, it has severe limitations and raises a number of
doctrinal hurdles of its own.”64
The People’s Republic of China (“PNC” / “China”) “is a united and
multi-ethnic country, with a unitary system of government yet a multitiered legal system.”65 China has suffered from “grave climate damage”
in recent years.66 Broad national statutory principles of civil law, tort
law, and environmental law could conceivably construe a climate tort
under Chinese law.67 “Environmental torts encompass conduct or
activities (industrial or from other anthropogenic sources) which cause
harm or damage to personal, property or environmental rights and
interests or to public property.”68 Interestingly, as a departure from
common law tort principles, “[a]s the principle of causation presumption
Id. (footnote omitted).
62
Id. at 86–98.
63
Id. at 98.
64
Id. at 99.
65
Deng Haifeng, China, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 112.
66
Id. at 124. The details are as follows:
In 2009, [China] suffered from extremely high temperatures in summer
and very low temperatures in winter, temperatures it had not
witnessed for decades. An extraordinarily severe drought occurred in
2009–10 in southwest China, the most serious drought in recorded
history. In 2010, fourteen rounds of rainstorm [sic] continuously
attacked south China and regions south of the Yangtze River . . . ; ten
rounds of rainstorms continuously attacked north China and west
China and temperatures were high beyond historical extremes in many
places. Cumulatively, these caused major casualties and economic loss
to China.
Id. at 124–25 (footnote omitted).
67
Id. at 135.
68
Id. (footnote omitted).
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is applicable to environmental torts, the burden of proof is reversed, i.e.,
the party causing the injury shall bear the burden of proving that there is
no causality between the act causing the injury and the harmful result.”69
Moreover, “strict liability is applicable to environmental torts in China,
which means that liability will be imposed on the person legally
responsible for the loss or damage without a finding of fault being
necessary.”70 Yet, because of the code-based stringency of Chinese
environmental tort law, “[s]ince there is no provision in China for
private law liability directly caused by climate change,” one observer
contends that “GHG emissions will not give rise to tort liability.”71
India is subject to national and state legislation, in addition to a
panoply of subordinate administrative rules; moreover, as “a legacy of
its colonial past,” it has a common law heritage that relies on judicial
precedent.72 “India will soon be a significant contributor to climate
change. India is predicted by some estimates to become the third largest
emitter by 2015. . . with the United States, European Union, China and
Russia, to account for two-thirds of global greenhouse gases . . . .”73
India faces a variety of serious climate risks in coming decades.74 “There
have been no significant private law claims in India based on allegations
of actual or anticipated damage from climate change. However, should
claimants be inclined to bring such claims, the two torts that offer
promise are nuisance and negligence.”75 Premised on principles of
English common law tort, similar barriers exist under Indian law as
under Australian tort law76 in bringing a successful climate change tort.77

69
Id. at 136 (footnote omitted) (quoting Art. 66, Tort Law of the People’s Republic of
China, 2009).
70
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Art. 7, Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China,
2009).
71
Id. at 137.
72
Lavanya Rajamani & Shibani Ghosh, India, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note
35, at 139.
73
Id. at 140–41 (footnotes omitted).
74
According to one authoritative estimate:
[T]he annual mean surface air temperature in India is likely to rise by
1.7°C and 2.0°C in the 2030s; melting glaciers will increase flood risk
and decrease water supply; sea level rise . . . will threaten coastal
regions; monsoons, on which agriculture depends, will become more
erratic and rain less plentiful; and incidence of malaria and other
vector-borne diseases will increase, as will heat-related deaths and
illnesses. [Moreover], . . . by 2080–2100, there is a probability of [ten to
forty] per cent loss in crop production, and before 2025 India is likely
to reach a state of water stress.
Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted).
75
Id. at 164.
76
See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss4/3

Blomquist: Comparative Climate Change Torts

2012]

Comparative Torts

1067

Indonesia is subject to “significant negative impact” from climate
change risks.78 “Indonesia inherited its civil law system from the Dutch.
In addition to written laws, other sources of Indonesian law are custom,
case law, treaty and doctrine.”79 Two potential climate change theories
of action exist under Indonesian legislation: (1) an “[u]nlawful action”—
similar to the negligence concept of a breach of “reasonable care,” but
also encompassing contravention of “public decency” and “principles of
propriety/appropriateness,”80 and (2) “strict liability for actions that
cause a ‘serious threat to the environment.’”81
Japan’s legal system is a product of U.S. law that existed “during the
period of the Allied occupation after the Second World War,” but “major
[Japanese] codes, including the Civil code and the Criminal code, were
modelled [sic] on the French and German codes and are still heavily
influenced by the Civil law system.”82 Importantly, “[t]he earthquake on
11 March 2011 and nuclear incident in Fukushima is [sic] likely to change
national and governmental debate on future energy and climate policy”
in Japan since the previous national GHG “[twenty-five] percent
reduction target is premised on construction of fourteen new nuclear

77
In addition to negligence and nuisance torts, an absolute liability tort exists under
Indian law, stemming from a 1987 Supreme Court of India case. Rajamani & Ghosh, supra
note 72, at 166 (citing M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 S.C.C. 395). The basis of this
rule of absolute “liability is that a non-delegable duty is owed to the community to ensure
that highest standards of safety are maintained” when enterprises are involved in
“hazardous or inherently dangerous industrial activity and harm results on account of an
accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity.” Id.
(footnotes omitted).
78
Mas Achmad Santosa, Josi Khatarina & Rifqi Sjarief Assegaf, Indonesia, in CLIMATE
CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 178. In particular:
The combination of sea level rise and an increased occurrence of
extreme weather . . . will cause higher intensity of erosion and
abrasion. In turn, it will further negatively affect the changes in the
coastline that is already losing ground to higher sea level. This
negative impact is reflected in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta. It is
estimated that by 2100 Jakarta’s coastline will be reduced by [fifteen]
km, thereby directly affecting the central business district. The erosion
also contributed to the loss of twenty-four Indonesian islands in two
years (2005–07). Extreme weather also causes a significant negative
impact on the lives of the population that lives along the coastline.
This population is often subject to maritime accidents and disasters
caused by extreme weather, diseases, drought and flood.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
79
Id. at 181.
80
Id. at 194.
81
Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
82
Yukari Takamura, Japan, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 206.
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plants, which might now be impractical with public opposition.”83
Under a Japanese civil code provision first enacted in 1896, and still in
effect, tort liability for intentional or negligent “violat[ion] [of] the rights
of others,” triggers civil liability for compensation and injunctive relief.84
Regarding negligence, “[s]ome [Japanese] lower courts dealing with
pollution cases have passed judgments to the effect that when there is a
threat to life and body, costs to avoid the damage should not be
considered and [enterprises] should be obliged to cease operations.”85
Strict liability, without fault, exists under Japanese law for “hazardous
activities involving significant risks” to others.86 Some recent Japanese
courts have liberalized factual causation burdens of victims by
considering “epidemiologic evidence of factual causation between
collective acts and the disease” and “award[ing] compensation tailored
to the degree of probability,” thus allowing “discounted compensation
providing that there is a substantial likelihood that claimants suffer from
the [environmental] disease.”87 Interestingly,
Injunctions have the potential [under Japanese tort law]
to play a powerful role in climate protection: [F]or
instance, injunctions could result in the suspension or
limitation of those GHG emitting activities of large
emitters that are likely to cause climate change. The
difficulty lies in the need to show “unlawfulness”: [I]f
the activities in question are considered public in nature
and/or if the damage in question is regarded as not
significant, the [Japanese] courts would not order an
injunction. However, the courts have reconfirmed in
several cases that where there is a high probability of
damage to human health, even if the activities in
question are of a public nature, injunctive relief should
be provided.88

83
Id. at 210. A Japanese government report predicts the following climate change
impacts by 2050: increased flood damage, drastic changes in rice production areas, and a
doubling of heat stress deaths. Id. at 215.
84
Id. at 228 (quoting Civil Code, art. 709, 1986).
85
Id. (footnote omitted).
86
Id. at 229.
87
Id. at 229–30 (footnote omitted).
88
Id. at 232–33 (footnote omitted).
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In sum, regarding “civil litigation, Japanese case law demonstrates a
clear trend towards better environmental protection and more effective
remedies for victims.”89
C. Africa and Middle East National Laws
While the full legal and political ramifications of Egypt’s “Arab
Spring” revolution are still in flux,90 the broad framework of Egypt’s
legal system is based on a civil code.91 “The sources of Egypt’s laws in
order of priority are legislation, custom, the principles of Islamic Sharia,
and equity.”92 Egypt’s judiciary is “slow and—with the exception of the
higher courts—not very sophisticated.”93 Egypt’s climate change risks
are in the following sectors: “(1) agriculture and food security, (2)
coastal zones, (3) aqua-culture and fisheries, (4) water resources, (5)
human habitat and settlements, (6) tourism, and (7) human health.”94
Tort liability in Egypt is based on the Civil Code with fault being the
primary liability approach though there are also isolated areas of nofault, or strict, liability.95 Climate change private law tort claims for
compensation, according to knowledgeable commentators, “will likely
fail because of the requirements of actionable damage under Egyptian
law.”96
Israel’s “legal system has its roots in the British Mandate on
Palestine. The British, who ruled Palestine between 1917 and 1948,
replaced many of the legal rules and institutions that were in place
during the Ottoman era, infusing the legal system with significant
common law elements.”97 Climate change risks for Israel include sea
level risk and accompanying loss of land and structures along the
Mediterranean Sea, desertification, soil erosion, salinization, surface
runoff, water supply disruptions, vector-borne diseases, water-related
illness, agricultural damage, and increased geo-political conflicts.98 No
private law climate tort claims have yet to be filed; “[d]ue to the many
89
90

Id. at 240.
See, e.g., Matt Bradley, Egypt Vote Puts Military Role in Play, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2012, at

A8.
Dalia Farouk & Lamiaa Youssef, Egypt, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35,
at 245.
92
Id. (footnote omitted).
93
Id. “Seeking redress through the courts could therefore be a lengthy process with
uncertain outcomes.” Id.
94
Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
95
Id. at 260.
96
Id. at 271.
97
Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Israel, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 272
(footnote omitted).
98
Id. at 277–78.
91
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difficulties a plaintiff would face in establishing liability, it is not
anticipated that such a claim would be filed in the near future.”99 Future
Israeli climate change torts—based on a codification of British common
law torts—are likely to be predicated on “nuisance, breach of statutory
duty and negligence.”100 Significantly, with the encouragement of the
Supreme Court of Israel, negligence per se claims, based on statutory
violations that cause harm, have proliferated, and climate change tort
actions of the future may be based on this theory of liability.101 “The
most likely defendants in Israel” of climate change torts include the
following: “(1) large producers of fossil fuels and gas (such as oil
refineries and natural gas companies) and (2) heavy users of fossil fuels,
fuel oil, coal and gas that cause GHG emissions, including large
industrial and power generators.”102 Israeli tort law damages are
liberally construed by the courts allowing for not only recovery of
personal injuries and property damage but also for pure economic
damages, such as lost profits or higher prices.103 A judicial trend of
recognizing “statistical-based compensation” has made proving factual
causation in difficult tort cases easier for Israeli plaintiffs.104
In 1994, South Africa moved from a racially-based parliamentary
sovereignty system “to a constitutional democracy underpinned by a
progressive Bill of Rights,” which includes, among other provisions, “an
environmental right.”105 “Notwithstanding these developments, the
historic Roman-Dutch legal system, a mixed legal system reflecting
aspects of both the European civil law and the English common law
traditions, was retained.”106 Significant warming is predicted for the
country by mid-century and, “[a]fter 2050, warming is projected to reach
around 3–4°C along the coast, and 6–7°C in the interior.”107 According to
one assessment: “These types of temperature changes will place a
massive strain on an already water-stressed nation currently dealing
with problems of poverty and unemployment, poor service delivery and
Id. at 286.
Id.
101
Id. at 287–88.
102
Id. at 289. “Even through many other corporations and all individuals emit GHGs
into the atmosphere, they are not potential defendants because the de minimis doctrine
protects them from liability.” Id. (footnote omitted).
103
Id. at 290–91.
104
Id. at 292–93 (footnote omitted).
105
Jan Glazewski & Debbie Collier, South Africa, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra
note 35, at 320 (footnote omitted); cf. Patricia Kameri-Mbote & Collins Odote, Kenya, in
CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 296, 312–15 (detailing a British-influenced tort
law approach that is more traditional than that of South Africa).
106
Glazewski & Collier, supra note 105, at 320 (footnote omitted).
107
Id. at 319 (footnote omitted).
99

100
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low levels of education.”108 Unlike the Anglo-American common law
system of separately defined tort causes of action, in South Africa, the
law of delict is the principal private law approach for seeking legal
redress for injuries with “general principles or requirements that
determine delictual liability.”109 The five essential requirements of a
delict under South African law are: “an act or omission; wrongfulness;
fault; causation; and harm (loss).”110 Establishing legal causation “is
likely to constitute a stumbling block in establishing liability for climate
change” under South African law.111 “While there is to date no climate
change” private law litigation extant, South African law is characterized
by “the evolving nature of . . . private law principles which renders the
law capable of adapting to new scenarios and threats of harm.”112
D. Europe and Eurasia National Laws
The European Union (“EU”) consists of twenty-seven member states
and is governed by a regional treaty and a panoply of regional
legislation and administrative directives.113 However, “neither the
human rights provisions nor the EU rules on environmental policy
allow” private litigants to bring actions regarding climate change
liability “to the EU courts.”114 Private law litigants within the EU nationstates must bring legal actions in domestic courts of a particular
country.115
Germany is governed by “a civil legal system” with laws
promulgated by national, state, regional, and municipal legislative
bodies, subject to judicial scrutiny and interpretation.116 Climate change
environmental risks for Germany in the future entail more extreme
precipitation and flooding, low water periods during dry summers,
greater erosion, and potential ground and surface water
contamination.117 There have been “no direct climate liability claims”
under German private law to date.118 “Commentators from some law
Id.
Id. at 333.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 341.
112
Id. at 344.
113
Ludwig Krämer, European Union Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at
351–52.
114
Id. at 374–75.
115
Id.
116
Hans-Joachim Koch, Michael Lührs & Roda Verheyen, Germany, in CLIMATE CHANGE
LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 376–77.
117
Id. at 386.
118
Id. at 399.
108
109
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firms have expressed views that are very sceptical [sic] as to the chances
of success of such claims; and debate has now started . . . as to whether
such claims would be covered by standard liability insurance.”119
German law follows general principles of delict for wrongful conduct
causing harm.120 With analogues to common law torts of negligence,
nuisance, and strict liability,121 one set of commentators have predicted
“that substantial potential [private law liability] lies in [German] cases
where the owner of a coastal property claims costs for increasing coastal
protection infrastructure from, for example, operators of large coal-fired
power plants” and “claims for damages after a major storm flood.”122
England, a constitutional monarchy without a written constitution, is
a common law legal system with well-developed tort jurisprudence.123
Climate change concerns for England, and the larger inclusive United
Kingdom, entail “an increased risk of flooding, coastal erosion, damage
to essential infrastructure due to intense rain events and increased levels
of UV radiation.”124 As of early 2012, “[t]here have been no significant
private law claims in England based directly on allegations of actual or
anticipated damage from climate change.”125 A pithy projection of
future English tort law actions for climate change damages asserts:
Whether or not “direct” cases involving actions against
emitters and similar defendants for damages for the
effect of climate are successful, it is very likely that there
will be much litigation against professionals, public
bodies, utility companies and other categories of
defendant, for damage allegedly caused or contributed
to by climate change. These cases typically [will]
involve allegations that the defendant failed to factor in
the effects of climate change, whether in designing
buildings, planning civil engineering projects, or
auditing accounts of a company exposed to climaterelated risks. This type of potential for liability is of
great significance not only to those directly at risk from
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 400.
121
Id. at 399.
122
Id. For a discussion of a similar civil law private wrong approach to climate change
harms see Bartosz KuraĤ, Maciej Szewczyk, Dominik Waãkowski, Tomasz Wardyęski &
Izabela Zielięska-Barãoİek, Poland, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 417,
428–36.
123
Silke Goldberg & Richard Lord QC, England, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note
35, at 445.
124
Id. at 449 (footnote omitted).
125
Id. at 458.
119
120
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such actions, but to their investors, lenders, insurers and
professional advisers.126
English tort claims of negligence and nuisance might be filed in the
future based on damages to property caused by sea level rise, extreme
weather leading to property damage, and illnesses from warmer
weather.127
E. North America and South America National Laws128
Canada has a federal system of government with a common law
tradition of tort law outside of the civil law based province of Québec.129
Interestingly, “[c]limate change has . . . emerged as the environmental
issue in the eyes of the public in Canada over the past decade. It has also
become one of Canada’s great political, social and economic
challenges.”130 Northern areas of Canada “are experiencing significant
changes in temperature, precipitation and sea ice, which are affecting
ecosystems and northern aboriginal populations in particular.”131
Moreover, coastal areas risk damages from sea level rises, while western
provinces face reduced precipitation; further climate change worries
focus on forests, species, and agriculture.132 Canadian “[c]limate change
tort litigation actions could be brought in negligence, conspiracy, strict
liability, or public or private nuisance.”133
The legal system in Brazil is based on civil law; as a federal system of
government, the states share power with the federal government.134
Brazilian climate change risks include “floods in large cities like Sáo
Paulo [and] Rio de Janeiro among others; droughts in northern and
southern Brazil, accompanied by . . . [animal mortality] and fires in the

Id. at 459.
Id. at 460. “Harm in terms of economic loss alone is less likely to be actionable.” Id.
For a review of Russian private law developments see Fiona Mucklow Cheremeteff, Max
Gutbrod, Daria Ratsiborinskaya & Sergei Sitnikov, Russia, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY,
supra note 35, at 489, 512–17.
128
For analysis of U.S. climate change private law matters see supra Part II.
129
Meinhard Doelle, Dennis Mahony & Alex Smith, Canada, in CLIMATE CHANGE
LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 525–26.
130
Id. at 525.
131
Id. at 529.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 542 (footnote omitted). For Mexican climate change private law liability issues
see José Juan González Marquez, Mexico, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at
627, 637–42.
134
Yanko Marcius De Alencar Xavier & Pedro Lucas De Moura Soares, Brazil, in CLIMATE
CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 35, at 607.
126
127
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midwest due to low air humidity” and warmer temperatures.135
Uniquely, “[t]he basis for imposing civil liability on those causing
environmental damage is found in Article 225, [Section] 3 of the
Constitution.”136 Moreover, environmental civil liability under Brazilian
law “arise[s] under Article 927 of the Brazilian Civil Code, which affirms
the obligation to compensate damage regardless of fault when the
activity that gives rise to the damage entails an inherent risk of harming
others.”137
IV. CONCLUSION
Imagine a future climate change tort lawsuit, conceived and initiated
by creative plaintiffs’ lawyers who boldly argue for the judicial
recognition—in any country of the world discussed in this Article—of a
“[n]ew [t]ort[]” cause of action for damages, injunctive relief for
damages, and injunctive relief for personal or property damages.138 Of
course, the “right” plaintiffs would be essential: those who have
suffered identifiable property damages or personal injuries fairly
traceable to carbon-induced climate change. Moreover, it would be
optimal to sue manufacturers and electric utilities that clearly emit
massive amounts of carbon, or other GHGs, into the atmosphere.
Cobbling together comparative concepts from a number of tort
precedents and doctrines from around the world, our intrepid lawyers
might draw upon the following: (1) the tort of public nuisance from state
laws in the United States, focusing on the unreasonableness of the
defendants’ massive emissions over long periods of time, the foreseeable
risks of climate induced harm, and any efforts by the defendants to
withhold information about climate change risks from their
operations;139 (2) persuasive precedent of courts in nations that recognize
constitutional rights to a healthy and balanced environment;140 (3) the
principle of causation presumption, from Chinese environmental tort
law, whereby the party causing the injury bears the burden of proving
that there is no causality between the act causing the injury and the
harmful results;141 (4) the rule of absolute liability, from Indian law,
Id. at 610.
Id. at 615.
137
Id. at 616.
138
See Robert F. Blomquist, “New Torts”: A Critical History, Taxonomy, and Appraisal, 95
DICK. L. REV. 23 (1990) (discussing the public policy rationales of various American
appellate courts for considering the legal recognition of new tort causes of action with new
elements of a prima facie case).
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entailing a non-delegable duty owed to the community to ensure the
highest standards of public safety when enterprises are involved in
hazardous or inherently dangerous activities;142 (5) persuasive Japanese
judicial precedent requiring industrial operations to shut down, without
consideration of costs, when there exists a serious threat to life and
body;143 (6) liberal negligence per se liability for climate change damages
recognized under Israeli law based on violations of statutory and
administrative requirements of industrial operations;144 (7) the evolving
law of delict under South African law, providing flexibility for
accommodating legal redress to new scenarios and threats of harm; 145
and (8) other assorted liberalizing trends, principles, and doctrine.
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144
145

See supra notes 77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
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